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          Corporate Control and Credible Commitment* 
Ronald J. Gilson and Alan Schwartz** 
November 2014 
Abstract 
The separation of control and ownership – the ability of a small group effectively 
to control a company though holding a minority of its cash flow rights – is 
common throughout the world, but also is commonly decried.  The control group, 
it is thought, will use its position to consume excessive amounts of project returns, 
and this injures minority shareholders in two ways: there is less money and the 
controllers are not maximizing firm value.  To the contrary, we argue here that 
there is an optimal share of the firm that compensates the control group for 
monitoring managers and otherwise exerting effort to implement projects while 
inducing investors to fund the firm’s projects.  This result assumes that a 
controlling group can credibly commit not to consume more than its efficient share 
of firm cash flow.  When potential entrepreneurs cannot solve this credibility 
problem, some ex ante efficient firms fail to form because their potential principals 
cannot raise money at a price that does not reflect inefficient levels of private 
benefits of control. The ability of controllers to commit is increasing in the 
accuracy of judicial review of controlled transactions. Private contracting, we 
argue, would materially improve judicial accuracy.  Our principal normative 
recommendation therefore is to demote corporate fiduciary law from mandatory to 
a set of defaults. Many developing countries, however, lack an effective legal 
system, but their public corporations nonetheless commonly have a controlling 
shareholder and minority shareholders.  We explore various non-legal methods by 
which this shareholder credibly commits to a cap on private benefits of control, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* In December 2011, the authors prepared a report on behalf of an Israeli company for 
filing with an Israeli Law Reform Commission concerning proposed amendments to the Israel 
corporate law that would affect the corporate governance duties of companies that exerted 
control over other companies in which the controlling shareholder held a minority equity stake.  
Certain of the thoughts we expressed in that Report were a highly inchoate version of the ideas 
developed below. 
** Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School; Stern Professor of Law 
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Professor of Law, Yale Law School, and Professor, Yale School of Management.  This is a much 
revised version of an earlier paper “Contracting About Private Benefits of Control” (2013). Al 
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although we also show that these methods are less efficient than contracting in a 
mature legal system would be. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Controlling shareholders, long no more than shadowy characters in the 
background of the corporate governance debate, now figure prominently.1  Outside 
the United States, controlling shareholders are corporate governance.2  They are 
ubiquitous both in jurisdictions that have poor shareholder protection and in 
jurisdictions, such as Sweden and other northern European countries, which have 
good shareholder protection (Gilson 2006).  Commentary now recognizes that 
controlling shareholders, denoted here as “controllers”, also are a significant 
feature of the U. S. corporate governance landscape.   Families with large block 
holdings are commonplace, though less widespread than outside the U.S. 
(Anderson & Reeb 2003), and newly public U.S. companies increasingly preserve 
control in a founders’ group.  From the beginning of 2010 through the end of 
March 2011, 20 companies went to the market with dual class common stock and 
other structural features that allow the controlling shareholders to retain control 
with a less than equivalent equity investment.3  Facebook is the most vivid current 
example, but those with only a slightly longer memory will recall Zygna, Groupon 
and Google.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1In a “controlled company”, a cohesive group has decision control over corporate actions, 
even when the group does not have majority voting control.  The only “block” in a controlled 
company is the controlling group.  Common examples are control exerted through a pyramid 
corporate structure or a dual class common stock structure.   
2As examples, “In emerging economies, business groups are responsible for the vast 
majority of sales, assets, and value added.  A business group is in essence a leverage device: 
firms within the group band together to fund investments and startups and to share production, 
R&D, and marketing knowledge.  The group also enables a single entrepreneur to control vast 
knowledge-creating resources with a fraction of the capital that would be needed by a stand-
alone entity.”, (Siegel and Choudhury 2012); “… a series of recent studies on ownership 
structure reveals that in most markets a large number of listed companies do not have a widely 
dispersed ownership structure.  In general, they have one or more large shareholders that can be 
categorized as families, states and other industrial and financial companies”.  See Isakov and 
Weisskopf (2012).  In the US, approximately 35% of the S&P is family controlled. Anderson and 
Reeb (2003).  
3See IRRC Institute (2012).  For example, in 2012, there were 114 controlled firms in the 
S&P 1500.  See also Harvard Law School Forum (2012). 
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The controlled companies we analyze must access the capital market to fund 
projects.  It is becoming increasingly common for new companies to finance with 
outside debt4, but our companies are assumed to raise equity for two reasons.  First, 
the policy concern that controlled companies raise is the potential for exploitation 
of minority shareholders.  Selling equity to the public provides both capital and 
shareholders to exploit, and where the controller has less equity than control, a 
greater incentive to do so. (Classens, Djankov & Lang 2000) Second, new 
controlled companies sometimes cannot raise debt.  Because creditors enforce their 
claims by attaching and selling debtor assets, a firm cannot borrow unless it has 
assets that have value on secondary markets.  The main asset in some startups, 
such as tech companies, is human capital, which cannot be sold.  Also, secondary 
markets seem not to work well in some developing economies, with which we also 
are concerned. 
Controlled companies that raise equity must solve two moral hazard 
problems.  The first problem is to persuade the capital market that the controllers 
will work hard.  Because controllers bear the costs of conceiving and implementing 
projects but must share gains with investors, the controllers may choose 
suboptimal effort levels.  The second problem is to persuade the capital market that 
the controllers will not divert private benefits of control – transfers from the 
company that go only to the controller and so reduce the minority’s share of the 
company’s profits. 
Controllers solve the first problem by contracting with investors over the 
division of project returns.  The controllers’ retained share must satisfy two 
constraints: In expectation (a) the firm can recover project costs; (b) The 
controllers’ share above cost is large enough to make working efficiently pay 
controllers more than would shirking.5  When these constraints are satisfied, 
outside investors will assume that controllers maximize expected project returns. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Robb and Robinson (2014). 
5 A third constraint is that the controllers retain enough of the firm to ensure control.  We 
assume that the share that satisfies the two constraints above satisfies this constraint as well in 
order to avoid an unnecessary analysis of possible voting games. 
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The second moral hazard problem is the focus of this paper because it is 
much harder for controllers to solve, for three reasons.  First, when shareholders 
are atomized they will not monitor controllers.  Second, monitoring would be 
difficult in any event because controller actions and project returns often are 
private information and controllers would be expected to make private benefits 
unobservable by the minority.  The third reason is that requires elaboration.  
Controllers often take their shares through business practices that can be efficient 
but are subject to abuse.  For example, the controllers of Company A may sell 
goods to Company B at sub-market prices because they hold a larger stake in B 
than in A.  The controllers of A may appoint themselves its managers and pay 
themselves above market wages.  Similarly, controllers may borrow from or lend 
to Company A at below, or above, market interest rates.6 These transactions have 
two features.  The transaction genres themselves may be efficient.  For example, 
insiders may charge their firm less for debt than the market because the insiders are 
better informed and control firm actions.  On the other hand, the transactions can 
be distorted in difficult to detect ways.  Thus, it may be hard for an outsider to 
distinguish between an efficient and an exploitative transfer price. 
Controllers would like to make credible promises to limit private benefits of 
control to the efficient level (we develop the efficient level of private benefits in 
Parts 2 and 3).  This is because, given the three reasons just set out, potential 
investors will realize that taking private benefits of control may be advantageous to 
the controller.7  The investors’ best response is to demand more of the firm than is 
necessary to satisfy the cost and incentive constraints required to ensure optimal 
controller effort.  These demands increase the company’s cost of equity capital and 
so reduce the gain from owning the firm.  As a result, some efficient but costly 
projects may not be pursued.  The controllers’ basic financing problem thus is to 
make credible commitments to potential investors concerning the future level of 
private benefits.  It is widely believed that their efforts are not fully successful.8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Tareq, et al (2014) has an extensive description of how controllers compensate 
themselves through related party transactions. 
7 Part 3 below proves that, under plausible assumptions, controllers always will take more 
private benefits than they promised investors if they can.  This result is consistent with the data. 
8 Tareq, et al, supra note 6, claim: “Using these controlling mechanisms controlling 
shareholders can gain control of a company with minimum cash flow right.  This discrepancy 
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Many jurisdictions, including the United States, approach the commitment 
problem indirectly, by regulating with the fiduciary duty of loyalty the transactions 
through which controllers can divert private benefits.  In the United States, this law 
does not prohibit controlled transactions but puts the burden on controllers to show 
that the terms of a challenged transaction are “entirely fair” to the minority.  Entire 
fairness is the most rigorous of all corporate law standards of judicial review9, and 
courts will void a transaction or give the minority damages if the controllers cannot 
satisfy it.  With only limited exceptions, the duty of loyalty, and its associated strict 
judicial review, is mandatory.10  Effective judicial review improves the controllers’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
between control and cash flow right motivate controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholder assets through related party transactions.” For other examples, “The conventional 
wisdom in the financial literature is that business groups are primarily expropriation devices for 
their controlling shareholders.”, and “The prevailing hypothesis in the corporate governance 
literature … is that business groups function as expropriation devices and will wither as a 
country embraces the rule of law.” See Siegel and Choudhury (2012) at 1795, 1796; “The 
literature also highlights the consequences of dominant shareholder agency risk for minority 
shareholders through the nefarious impact of control concentration on equity values.”  See Aslan 
and Kumar (2012) at 2257-58.  Consistent with these views, the stock of controlled firms sells at 
material discounts. 
9 Under entire fairness review, the court does not exhibit the usual strong deference to 
director approval.  Rather, the court exercises its own judgment concerning whether the terms of 
the transaction being reviewed would be seen in a similar arm’s length transaction. .  Indeed, the 
standard doctrinal rhetoric in Delaware accords controlling shareholders no deference at all.  
Thus, then Chancellor Strine’s treatment of Conrad Black in Hollinger v. Hollinger International, 
Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004), is more distinctive in the Chancellor’s broad denial that a 
contractually designed control structure gives a controlling shareholder any special treatment 
under Delaware law than in his condemnation of the techniques Black used to funnel money to 
himself and his confederates. 
10 The Delaware Supreme Court stated, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v, QVC 
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (1994): “To the extent that a contract, or a provision of it, 
purports to require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary 
duties, it is invalid and unenforceable…. Paramount directors could not contract away their 
fiduciary obligations.” Delaware General Corporation Law section 122(17) authorizes an 
ordinary public company, by contract or in its charter, to alter the application of one component 
of the duty of loyalty – the corporate opportunity doctrine – but the duty of loyalty is otherwise 
mandatory.  In contrast, Delaware law permits limited liability companies and limited 
partnerships to contract to modify, limit or even eliminate fiduciary duties.  As of 2012, 85 
Delaware LLCs and LPs have gone public.  These are primarily master limited partnerships in 
the resource industry, but they include some private equity vehicles.  The great majority of these 
entities have taken advantage of Delaware’s invitation to contract, and tailored the scope of 
corporate fiduciary duties to their circumstances.  See Manesh (2012).  Enriques (2014) surveys 
the approaches of European countries to restricting private benefits of control, including a recent 
6	  
	  
ability to credibly commit to a ceiling on private benefits because the courts will 
enforce a legally imposed limit.11 
 
Judicial review, however, can improve but will not fully solve the 
controllers’ commitment problem for two reasons.  First, the problem is to 
convince investors that controllers will not take more than the efficient share they 
promised to the capital market.  Fairness review does not focus courts on that 
number: rather, it asks courts to evaluate the distributional properties of 
transactions ex post without regard to efficiency benefits.  As a consequence, such 
review may generate a number that can be greater or lesser than the ex ante 
promised number.  Potential investors likely optimize against the court’s number 
rather than the firm’s unreliable number.  Capital structure contracts – i.e., 
contracts that divide the company’s future value – may be assumed efficiently to 
harmonize cost and incentive needs.  Judicially generated numbers do not deserve 
that presumption with respect to private benefits.  Hence, relying on judicial 
review alone to satisfy the controllers’ commitment problem may not solve it, and 
may yield inefficient results as well.  Second, even partially effective judicial 
review requires capable courts, a requirement that is difficult to satisfy in many 
countries, with the shortfall increasing in the ineffectiveness of the courts. 
 
This analysis is the basis for our principal normative recommendation, 
which is to open up the contracting space so that controlled companies can contract 
with investors not only over shares of the firm, which can be done today, but also 
over  private benefits of control – the extent to which company profits can be 
divided other than by shares owned –which cannot be done today. Controller 
contracts with investors could supply courts with rich contextual descriptions of 
the transactions through which the controllers will be paid so courts can more 
easily distinguish legitimate transfers from tunneling and so reduce the cost of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European Commission proposal to harmonize the treatment of related party transactions within 
the European Union. 
11 Reputation can also facilitate commitment but we do not focus on reputation here 
because controlled companies commonly are only intermittent capital market users.  Hence, 
potential investors will realize that they seldom could punish cheating controllers by offering 
unfavorable terms on future deals.  We discuss in Part 5 the role of reputation in facilitating 
credible commitment in countries without effective judicial systems. 
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equity capital, as well as allow efficient levels of private benefits that can increase 
future profits.  The contractual solution has not been tried seriously because it is 
difficult to contract over or around fiduciary duties.  Extent legal rules give courts 
the ability to exercise unrestrained judicial review.  Thus, we suggest that fiduciary 
duties should be demoted from mandatory rules to defaults.  
 
Turning to the prior literature, several authors show that controllers take 
shares of project returns as private benefits but the literature seldom considers the 
problem that occupies us: how to facilitate controller commitment to the capital 
structures they offer the market.  Rather, prior papers document the existence of 
payments to controllers, specify how they are made and commonly conclude that 
the payments are improper.12 The sparse theoretical literature sometimes does not 
distinguish between pecuniary and nonpecuniary transfers.  For example, Aghion 
and Bolton, in a seminal paper, analyze an entrepreneur’s nonpecuniary gains, and 
show that entrepreneur control is efficient when “the entrepreneur’s objectives are 
perfectly in line with the social objectives” (Aghion and Bolton (1992) at 473, 
481).  The paper does not show how entrepreneur objectives come to be aligned 
with social objectives or what should be done when private and social goals are 
misaligned.  Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi consider an owner and a manager who 
owns no shares.  The manager would like to choose a project that maximizes his 
private payoff while large block shareholders have an incentive to monitor the 
manager to ensure that he chooses the project that maximizes their payoff.  
Extensive monitoring, however, curbs the manager’s initiative, and so reduces the 
probability that he will discover good projects.  The paper concludes: “The paper’s 
key idea is that a dispersed ownership structure commits shareholders not to 
exercise effective control.  Consequently, ownership concentration involves a 
trade-off between control and initiative.” (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) at 
693, 719).  In their model, the manager rather than the shareholder owners 
consumes private benefits from project returns, so the paper does not study how 
controllers commit to shareholders with respect to private benefits.  Goshen and 
Hamdani (2013) argue that entrepreneurs create controlled companies in order to 
protect their ability to pursue business strategies.  This motivation is consistent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12See authorities cited note 8, supra, and, e.g., Nenova (2003); Dyck and Zingales (2004); 
Atanasov, Black, and Ciccotello (2011); Farrar and Watson (2012).   
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with the entrepreneurs diverting private benefits from the return their preferred 
strategy yields.  These authors do not study how the entrepreneurs commit not to 
take too many private benefits.	  
 
Perhaps the paper closest to ours is Urtiaga and Sáez (2013). In their model, 
projects are self-financed and the controller has a choice whether to take a project 
that precludes private benefits or a project that permits them.  Both projects have 
the same expected return so the goal is to induce the controller to take the project 
that maximizes the sum of public and private benefits.  The paper’s solution is a 
contract that permits the minority, if controllers choose the private benefits project 
and it fails, either to put their shares to the controller or to buy shares from him.  
This is an imaginative way to reduce private benefits but, we argue, the state 
should not want to deter them altogether because they can be efficient.  Rather, the 
concern is how to facilitate controller commitment not to divert private benefits in 
amounts that are inconsistent with the controllers’ capital structure promise.  
Utriaga and Saez do not study this problem.	  13	  	  Finally, a paper that is unusual in 
recognizing the concern that we analyze remarks: “From a theoretical point of 
view, it is not clear which of the two effects [monitoring gain from concentration; 
diversion of profits by the control group] prevails in companies with a large 
shareholder.” (Isakov and Weisskopf (2012) at 2). We argue below that monitoring 
(and other types of effort) can be induced with the correct choice of capital 
structure, provided that the control group can commit to the structure.        
 
Part 2 below sets out a simple agency finance model that shows how an 
appropriate division of the firm between the controllers and the equity investors 
solves the controllers’ ex ante moral hazard problem.  Part 3 formalizes the 
controllers’ ex post problem, of committing not to divert more private benefits than 
promised (zero in the limit), and shows that judicial review, even if focused 
directly on recovering diverted funds, will not solve the problem completely.  Part 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Muravyev (2014) shows that a reform of Russian corporate law that permitted 
nonvoting shareholders (in a dual class structure) to veto changes to their class rights increased 
the value of the shares.  This reform is consistent with our normative suggestions, but we are 
concerned more broadly with how to prevent controllers from changing the original capital 
structure deal by tunneling. 
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4 shows how allowing controllers and investors to contract over fiduciary duties 
would make judicial review more effective and so increase the controllers’ ability 
to commit.  The idea here is to apply new contract theory, which shows that parties 
use contracts to send informative and reliable signals to the court of their ex ante 
intentions. Part 5 introduces the question how controllers credibly commit to limit 
diversion in countries with ineffective courts.  The presence of weak courts raises 
an interesting and important question: If courts are ineffective so that judicial 
review, applying fiduciary duty alone or aided by contract, cannot deter controller 
overreaching, why do minority shareholders exist at all?  (Gilson 2007).  We 
suggest, as a possible answer, that there is an industrial organization of controller 
behavior.  As an example, related party transactions that create large transfers to 
controlling shareholders often are observable simply because of their size.  Our 
analysis implies that controllers may credibly commit to capping transfers to 
themselves by, for example, foregoing vertical relationships with companies in 
which the controllers have an interest or otherwise committing to limit the terms of 
those transactions in a fashion that is observable.  This would reduce the potential 
for transfer pricing arrangements that unduly favor controlling shareholders even 
in the absence of an effective court system.  The analysis here is positive: contract 
apparently would dominate these structural solutions.  Part 6 concludes.  
  
2. A Moral Hazard Model14 
 
2.1 The model 
	  
T0: A set of risk neutral entrepreneurs, the “controllers”, conceive a project 
that costs k to implement.  The controllers are liquidity constrained and so must 
raise k in a competitive capital market populated by risk neutral investors.  An 
unsuccessful project returns zero; a successful project generates a positive return v 
where v ε U[vl, vh].15  Hence, the expected value of a successful project is 𝑣! =    !!!!!! . The probability of success is increasing in the controllers’ effort.  The 
success probability is pl if the controllers exert low effort and is ph if they exert 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Part 2 applies a standard agency cost model to the problem of motivating the owners of 
less than all of a firm’s return to choose efficient effort levels. 
15 We assume that value is uniformly distributed between vl and vh. 
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high effort: pl < ph.  The term high effort includes the provision of services or 
inputs that are most efficiently provided by the controller.  The project’s expected 
value vs is common knowledge but the realized return, v*, is private information 
that a law suit may uncover.   
T1: The controllers offer the expected return vo to equity investors in the 
form of stock.  The controllers retain ve (ve + vo = vs).  Hence, the investors own 
vo/vs = τ of the firm and the controllers own ve/vs = (1 – τ).  We later show how the 
controllers choose τ.  For now, we assume that shareholders are atomized so that 
the controllers have formal (and in this model real) control.16    
T2: The controllers (a) begin to implement their project and (b) create a 
technology that permits them to capture project returns beyond their equity share. 
For example, the controllers may structure inter-company trades partly to benefit 
themselves.17 
T3:  The issue is whether controllers can commit not to divert returns so we 
assume that returns exist (i.e., the project succeeds).  The controllers then decide 
whether to report the realized return v* or a lower return vr. The controllers’ realize 
(1 – τ)v* if they report truthfully and (1 – τ)vr + v* - vr if they underreport.  Their 
net diversion gain thus is τ(v* - vr).  For example, if v* = 100, and τ = .4, the 
controllers realize 60 if they report v* and 60 + .4(100 – 80) = 68 if they report a vr 
of 80. The investors realize τ of the reported return: .4 x 80 = 32, which is 20% less 
than their promised share.18   
T4:  The investor/shareholders can observe at positive cost a signal, xi, that 
correlates with the realized return: i ε {l, h}.  The signal is bad news (i = l) or good 
news (i = h).  Bad news indicates that the project returned less than expected; good 
news indicates that the product returned more than expected.  Hence, the informed 
shareholder who observes the signal xl believes that the realized value is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In the U.S., shareholders are in fact concentrated record owners, who hold their shares 
as fiduciaries for the beneficial owners.  Mutual funds are an important example of such equity 
intermediation.  Because the record owner intermediaries are not proactive, the standard 
atomized shareholder assumption does not affect the analysis.  See Gilson & Gordon (2013). 
17 We show in Part 3 that controllers will use such structures to cheat. 
18 If the investors successfully sue, the controllers must return the cheating gain (8 in the 
example).  Law suits may deter cheating because it is costly to divert.  We analyze law suits in 
Part 3. 
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𝑣 x! =    !!!  !"! .  If the shareholder receives the signal xh, he believes the realized 
value is v(xh) = 
!!!!!!   .  The informed shareholder may take an action, described 
below, if he suspects that the firm underreports: that is, vr < v(xi). 
2.2 Analysis: The controllers’ ex ante incentive and the firm’s cost of 
capital19 
The controllers can exert high effort and realize phve , the expected value of 
their share in the firm.  Alternatively, they can exert low effort and realize a lower 
expected value on their stake, but they can receive a private benefit y in the form of 
the opportunity cost of the effort saved (shirking, including the failure to provide 
specialized inputs).  Thus, y is the private value of exerting suboptimal effort. The 
controllers exert high effort if phve > plve + y, or if 𝑣! >    !∆!.  The project has 
positive expected value only if the controllers work hard: 
phvs – k > 0 
plvs – k + y < 0 
The shirking private benefit and the probabilities are not verifiable (and may not be 
observable).  
The controllers exert low effort unless their incentive constraint is satisfied.  
Therefore, the maximum that the controllers can promise to potential equity 
investors is  
(1)  𝑧 =   𝑝!(𝑣! −    !∆!) 
The right hand side term is the project’s expected return conditional on the 
controllers exerting high effort, but reduced by the incentive payment.  The project 
cost is k so the project is fundable if z ≥ k.  We assume for now that this inequality 
is satisfied.20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 We assume here that controllers report the return truthfully.  This assumption is relaxed 
when we analyze cheating. 
20 When z < k, the controllers may hire an independent monitor.  If the monitoring cost is 
q and there is a competitive monitoring market, controllers can promise the monitor phm = q, 
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In a competitive capital market, investors earn zero profits.21  Thus, if 
investors contribute k, they expect to get k back, which includes the market return.  
This implies that the promised return to investors, vo, solves k = phvo + (1 – ph)0.  
The investors thus are promised τ = (k/ph)/vs =    !!!!  of the firm.  The controllers 
expect to earn phve = ph(vs – vo).  They receive the expected surplus because vo is 
the expected value of k.  The controllers’ cost of capital is  
(2) !!!  - 1 
To summarize, the controllers will choose the ex ante efficient investment 
level if they realize the incentive payment y/Δp – the private benefit – paid out of a 
successful project.   The project is fundable if the total expected project return 
conditional on the controllers exerting optimal effort, less the private benefit 
incentive payment, equals or exceeds the share of the firm the controllers must 
promise to outsiders in order for them to contribute the project’s cost.22  Because 
the controllers retain a positive share of the firm, ve, they are entitled to a positive 
share of project returns.23 We next consider how judicial review – the court’s effort 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
where m is the monitoring price.  Let the monitor reduce the controllers’ private benefit to ym < 
y.  Then the controllers could fund their project if 𝑝! 𝑣! − !!∆! ≥ 𝑘 + 𝑞.    The independent 
monitoring solution has more theoretical than actual appeal because monitoring markets seem 
scarce.  The text thus restricts analysis to the case where the incentive payment is the only 
instrument for inducing optimal effort.  
21 In standard finance terms, investors earn market returns for the risk they undertake. 
22 In this simple model, the equity claim also can be characterized as debt, where the 
controllers would promise to repay vo or enter bankruptcy.  The choice between debt and equity 
would matter in more complex models, but it is not necessary for the issues we analyze to use 
such models. 
23 There is little data studying the relation between the payments to controllers and firm 
value or financing choices.  Some recent studies are suggestive, however.  A study of family 
controlled Indian business groups found that the center efficiently allocated resources from low 
growth areas to high growth areas.  V. Ravi Anshuman and Niredita Sinha, “Power Struggles, 
Tunneling Incentives and Investment Efficiency in Diversified Business Groups”, Working 
Paper (2012).  Allocating resources efficiently is an aspect of efficient managing.   Another study 
of Indian firms found that business groups with controlling shareholders functioned efficiently 
and grew as corporate governance regulation in India improved (“We exonerate many of the 
firms implicated in the literature’s well-known finding that Indian business groups are typically 
expropriators: instead, we find that they are honest actors engaged in value creation”. Seigel and 
Choudhury, supra note 2, at 1766).  Mahoney asked whether the value of US public utilities 
declined when the Public Utility Holding Company Act banned pyramid structures; the utilities 
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to enforce controller fiduciary duties – affects the controllers’ incentive to take 
more than their contracted share. 
3. Cheating and judicial review  
3.1 The privately optimal level of private benefits 
The controllers’ privately optimal level of private benefits is positive for 
three reasons.24  First, the minority is entitled to the share τ of the project’s return. 
Recalling that the return is private information, controllers have an incentive to 
reduce τ by reporting vr rather than v*: that is, to underreport. Second, because 
penalties are not permitted, investors who discover cheating are entitled only to 
return of the amount of the private benefit; there is no direct financial sanction.  
Third, the probability that excess private benefits are discovered is less than one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
previously had been held in pyramid form.  He found that, before the Act, controllers transferred 
material resources to themselves, but the evidence “is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
utility pyramids were beneficial to their members at all levels of the pyramid and that the 
dissolution of the holding companies was expected to harm public shareholders.” Paul G. 
Mahoney, “The Public Utility Pyramids”, 41 J. Legal Studies 37, 56 (2012).  A recent study 
found in a very different framework – shareholders choose the firm’s capital structure and the 
compensation contract and the managers’ compensation is limited to a wage and an ownership 
stake – that the optimal managerial input into production is increasing in the stake.  Empirically, 
“increasing CEO ownership by one standard deviation, from 14.3% to 20%, implies an increase 
in firm value equal to $662 million on average.”  Jeffrey L. Coles, Michael L. Lemmon, J. Felix 
Meschke, ”Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial 
ownership and corporate performance”, 103 J. Financial Econ. 149, 150 (2012).  Another study 
(using Canadian firms) found that family members received higher performance related 
compensation in dual class firms than in single firms with a concentrated family ownership 
structure.  The difference applied to executives in general.  The controllers of the dual class firms 
owned significantly fewer cash flow rights than the concentrated owners of single class firms.  
These results are consistent with our model, in which paying money and owning stock can be 
substitutes.  See Ben Amoako-Adu, Vishaal Baulkaran, Brian Smith, “Executive compensation 
in firms with concentrated control: The impact of dual class structure and family management, 
“17 J. Corporate Finance 1580 (2011).  Another study found “a consistently negative correlation 
between firm value and blockholder dispersion, as well as between firm value and the total 
ownership stake of blockholders.”  The authors also noted: “Our results for blockholder size and 
presence suggest there may be room for private benefits of control by blockholders, possibly at 
the expense of other stakeholders.” Sander J.J. Konjin, Roman Kraussl, Andre Lucas, 
“Blockholder dispersion and firm value”, 17 J. Corporate Finance 1330, 1338 (2011).   
24 There apparently is a premise in the literature that better legal enforcement of existing 
law can drive cheating to zero.  As far as we know, we are the first to show that this premise is 
incorrect: substantive and structural reform are necessary.   
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because (a) courts are imperfect investigators and (b) investors may not purchase 
the costly signal of the project return xi, and thus may not sue.  Part 3.3 below 
focuses on the last factor.  This Part focuses on the others. Regarding factor (a), 
several causes work against judicial accuracy.  Long legal delays cause evidence 
and witness memories to decay; witnesses also may become unavailable.  Some 
legal systems have a limited ability to find facts.  For example, there may be 
limited or no discovery procedures.  Judges and lawyers also may lack commercial 
expertise.  And because firms have an incentive to conceal, any court is more 
likely to find that a firm took less than it did rather than more.   
The three reasons just set out – private information, no financial sanction 
and imperfect detection – imply that controllers will divert almost everything 
unless diverting project returns somehow is costly to them.25  In fact, diversion 
costs are positive and fall in two categories.  The first is the cost of taking an 
excess share of project returns. An example is helpful here.  Let the controllers of 
companies A and B believe that it is efficient for these companies to trade.  There 
is an optimal transfer price.  The controllers, however, may also plan to take more 
than their share of the company’s profits by “taxing” these intra-corporate trades 
through terms favorable to the controller.  The consequent distortion cost is 
minimized when controllers take only what their ownership position (and the level 
of private benefits the minority expects) entitles them to take.  Cheating controllers 
incur higher distortion costs because they take more.  In addition, controllers may 
distort the trading mechanism itself in order to conceal private benefits diversion.   
The second set of costs is incurred only if cheating controllers are 
discovered.  These costs are increasing in the maturity of the capital and labor 
markets in which firms function.  A minority can sell, or threaten to sell, stock 
when controllers are found to take unanticipated private benefits.  The prospect or 
reality of minority exit signals to the market that controllers probably cheated.  
This reduces the firm’s stock price, which has three important effects.  First, a fall 
in price directly reduces the value of the controllers’ ownership stake. Second, a 
lower stock price may indirectly reduce that stake.  In many companies, a major 
portion of key employees’ compensation is variable.  The employee receives 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 We assume that reputational sanctions are ineffective because controlled companies, 
especially in developing economies, enter equity markets infrequently. 
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options or restricted stock, and is motivated to work by the prospect of increases in 
share values.  Perceived excess private benefits reduce share values, and so reduce 
the incentives that these variable compensation contracts would otherwise create.  
The consequent fall in employee motivation may materially reduce the value of the 
firm.26  Third, employees also may quit when controllers appropriate a portion of 
the variable portion of the employees’ compensation contract, in itself a 
misappropriation but now at the expense of employees rather than minority 
shareholders.   
 
We next show that these costs, though real, cannot drive the misreporting 
parameter to zero.  This result rests on three further assumptions:  
A1: Distortion costs (category one) and discovery costs (category two) are 
increasing in the amount of the controllers’ private benefits. 
A2: In any legal system, judicial accuracy also is increasing in the amount of 
the controllers’ private benefits because it is harder to conceal a large 
diversion than a small diversion.27  
A3: There is a discovery probability below which unanticipated diversion 
goes undetected and above which it is discovered.  The cutoff probability is 
partly a function of the applicable legal system.  For example, if the 
controllers report half the realized return, the cutoff probability is lower 
under an accurate court than under an inaccurate court.   
Controllers who misreport take τ(v* - vr) = y. Denoting the distortion cost 
c(y) and the discovery cost s(y), the controllers choose y to maximize their 
expected cheating gain E(y): 
(3) E(y) = f(y)a(i)y + (1 – f(y)a(i))(-s(y)) – c(y) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Asker, et al (2014) show that managers care about the current value of the company’s 
stock. 
27 Formally, the probability that a court will discover misreporting is a function of the 
amount the controllers take, y, and the competence of the relevant judiciary, a.  Holding 
competence constant, (the controllers can function only under one system), we assume regarding 
the probability of discovery that  !"(!|!)!" > 0.  In words, if y > y’, then (1 – f(y|a)) strictly 
dominates (1 – f(y’|a)) in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. 
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The first term is the expected value of cheating successfully; the second term is the 
expected cost if the court finds cheating; and the third term is the necessary cost of 
cheating.  The cutoff probability is f(y)a(i), where a(i) indexes the accuracy of the 
reviewing court: i ε [L, H].   
The solution to the controllers’ maximization problem implies that 
controllers always divert more private benefits than they promised to the market, 
but take less as courts become more accurate.  To understand this result intuitively, 
realize that the controllers’ expected gain from misreporting increases in the 
amount of private benefits the controllers divert, but the distortion costs, the 
discovery costs and the discovery probability also increase in the amount the 
controllers divert.  As a consequence, controllers misreport – y is positive – but do 
not take everything.28 This result is consistent with the existence of controlled 
companies in countries with weak legal systems.  Controllers cheat – take more 
private benefits then promised – less under accurate courts because assumption 
A(3) implies that f(y)a(H) < f(y)a(L).  In words, holding constant the amount 
controllers take, the more accurate the reviewing court, the lower is the cutoff 
probability below which private benefit consumption goes undetected.  Therefore, 
the expected cheating gain is falling in judicial accuracy.  Figure 1 illustrates this 
conclusion:  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 We argue that the function E(y) is strictly concave.  Costs in the model are assumed to 
be quadratic: s(y) = ½(ys2) and c(y) = ½(yc2).  With subscripts omitted for convenience, the first 
derivative of the first term in Equation (3) is f’(y)y + f(y); the second derivative is f’’(y) + 2f(y).  
Because f(y) is falling as y increases (the probability of being found out increases in y), both 
derivatives are negative.  The first derivative of c(y) is yc and the second derivative is c.  Both 
derivatives are positive so there are convex costs, but the last term is preceded by a minus so that 
term also is negative.  For convenience, we let (1 – f(y)) = g(y).  Then the middle term is 
g(y)(s(y).  The first derivative is g’(y)(s(y) + g(y)s’(y) and the second derivative is g’’(y)s(y) + 
2g’(y)s’(y) + g(y)s’’(y).  Our disclosure cost assumption implies that all three terms are positive, 
but the entire expression is preceded by a minus sign so this term is negative as well.  Because 
the second derivatives of all three terms in Equation (3) are negative, the function is strictly 
concave.  Hence, it has a unique maximum at y, where 0 < y < v*.  Corner solutions are 
theoretically possible, but for y to equal 0, the cheating costs and discovery probability would 
have to be unrealistically high; and for y to equal v*, the cheating costs and discovery probability 
would have to be unrealistically low.  Therefore, the likely result, which is consistent with the 
data, is that controllers take money but leave some returns for the public shareholders.   
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Figure 1 
Expected Cheating Gain is Falling in Judicial Accuracy 
 
 
The controller’s gain from misreporting is plotted on the horizontal axis and 
the cost of cheating is plotted on the vertical axis.  The marginal cost curves 
represent the expected cost of cheating, which is increasing in the amount the 
controllers divert.  Because the gain is y= τ(v* - vr) and τ and v* are fixed ex post, 
the controllers’ strategy is progressively to reduce vr, thereby progressively 
increasing the misreporting gain y, until the expected marginal gain from a further 
reduction equals the expected marginal cost.   
  The solid curve reflects a relatively inaccurate court.   Controllers who 
anticipate being reviewed by this court take the cheating gain of yL.  The dashed 
marginal cost curve in the Figure represents a more accurate court.  The expected 
cost of cheating is higher when the more accurate court reviews transactions 
because it is more likely to find cheating at any level of private benefit diversion.  
Controllers who anticipate review by this court will capture the lower gain yH. The 
controllers thus divert fewer private benefits under accurate courts.  The 
shareholders’ loss from misreporting is just the controllers’ gain, or τ(v* - vr).  
3.2. Cheating and the cost of capital 
The analysis in Part 2 above assumed that controllers do not divert excess 
private benefits.  On this assumption, investors contribute the project cost k to the 
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controllers in return for τ of the firm, which equals k in expectation.   Part 3.1 
showed that controllers commonly cheat, however,: diverting some fraction of 
project returns is the norm.  Rational equity investors expect cheating and so 
realize that controllers likely will return less than the investors’ promised share.  
Shareholders have some purchase on the cheating parameter because they know 
the project’s expected value vs and the controllers’ corporate structure.  For 
example, diverting funds is easier in a pyramid structure with intercompany supply 
transactions than in a conglomerate structure where there are limited intercompany 
transactions.29   The potential investors best response to excess private benefits 
requires controllers to offer them τr > τ of the firm in return for contributing the 
project’s cost k.30  Recalling that τ equaled (vo/k)/vs and that k and vs are fixed in 
expectation, that tr > τ implies that the investors’ expected return must increase to 
some vo(r) > vo. The controllers’ cost of capital becomes 
(4) !!(!)! − 1. 
Equation (4) is larger than Equation (2): actual controllers, who will cheat, face a 
higher cost of capital than the controllers in our initial model.     
Controllers diverting more private benefits than promised is inefficient in 
two ways.  First, cheating is costly but has no positive incentive effect.  Second, 
controllers may have to give investors so much of the project – pay such a high 
capital cost – that their project is no longer attractive to the controller even though 
it has positive NPV.  The latter cost creates an incentive for controllers to commit 
not to divert excess private benefits.  As the analysis here shows, judicial review as 
presently practiced (without allowing contracting over private benefits of control) 
is an imperfect commitment device, whose effectiveness falls as the applicable 
judicial system worsens.  Parts 4 and 5 below consider other commitment methods.  
Before reaching them, we explore the concern that investors may rationally remain 
uninformed about cheating. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Part 5’s discussion of cheating without good courts extends this analysis. 
30 Assume that potential investors expect controllers to report some fraction β of the 
project’s return.  Recalling that the expected return is vs, investors will demand the share of the 
firm tr where tr solves tr(βvs) = τvs.  Hence, tr = τ/β which is greater than τ because β is less than 
one. 
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 3.3 Will investors sue? 
Minority shareholders will not sue unless they act as market monitors: that 
is, they purchase the signal of project returns x by incurring monitoring costs and 
sue if the disjunction between it and the reported value vr is substantial.  The 
assumption that shareholders monitor in this way may seem implausible.  
Shareholders in the model are atomized; the cost to each such shareholder of 
buying the signal and then possibly suing likely would exceed the gain.  Hence, an 
individual shareholder would monitor controllers only if he could buy enough 
stock at the artificially depressed price vr so that his gain from causing the price to 
rise to v* would justify the costs.  Other shareholders are unlikely to sell at vr, 
however.  These potential sellers know that the monitoring shareholder cannot 
make a gain unless the firm’s true value is above vr.  Because the distribution is 
uniform, the sellers would estimate the true value to be 𝑣! = !!!!!!   and refuse to 
sell.  But if the informed shareholder offers to buy at vt, potential sellers estimate 
the true value at !!!!!! .  Hence, a monitor cannot buy shares at a price below vh, but 
at this price he must expect to incur a loss.  Therefore, no shareholder likely would 
assemble a large enough block to justify buying the signal and then suing.31   
This simple market micro-structure argument fails if the relevant capital 
market contains liquidity traders, who are willing to incur a loss on selling shares. 
A minority shareholder may be able to assemble a block from these traders and 
then sue if he observes a bad signal. The litigation deterrent thus necessarily is 
weak, even under good courts, unless the relevant capital market also is deep.32   
4. Contract and commitment  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This is a straight forward application of the standard no trade theorem.  In the U.S., 
contingency fee lawyers can initiate a class action against controllers on behalf of all minority 
shareholders and therefore serve to aggregate the incentives of the class of minority shareholders 
though each owns little stock.  This possibility is becoming more difficult in the U.S. and seldom 
exists elsewhere. 
32 In practice, large minority shareholders on occasion play this role. For example, a 
Tweedy Brown mutual fund played a central role in the successful challenge to private benefits 
diversion by Conrad Black, the controller of Hollinger Inc.  (see Hollinger International, Inc. v. 
Black, 858 A.2d 342 (Del.Ch. 2004). 
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 4.1 Contract Forms 
 
Parts 2 and 3 derive three results: (i) Potential investors can expect 
controllers to maximize expected project returns because the controllers retain 
enough of their firm to make maximization worthwhile; (ii) Potential investors also 
can expect controllers to cheat by misreporting returns and diverting the concealed 
sums to themselves; the controllers’ incentive to cheat is decreasing in the 
effectiveness of judicial review and the size of the informal sanctions the market 
can impose on controllers whose cheating is discovered; (iii) Rational investors 
protect themselves against cheating by demanding a larger fraction of the firm than 
otherwise would be necessary to compensate them for funding the firm’s project 
and incentivizing the controllers.  Controllers thus internalize much of the cheating 
cost, but society also bears costs when controllers forego positive value projects 
because the difficulty of credibly committing causes investors to overestimate how 
much the controller expects to divert.  As a consequence, controllers would like to 
commit to potential investors not to cheat and society would like to increase the 
controllers’ commitment ability.  The state can pursue two complementary 
strategies: (a) It can improve court effectiveness by, for example, creating expert 
corporate courts where these do not exist; (b) Holding judicial effectiveness 
constant, the state can open up the contracting space, which would improve the 
ability of a court to recover the parties’ ex ante intentions and so better distinguish 
between controlled transactions that implement the controllers’ commitment and 
those that vitiate it.	  33	  Elsewhere, we have argued that the state can improve judicial 
effectiveness by creating an expert corporate court when such a court does not 
exist.34  We argue here that the state can help even effective courts by permitting 
parties to contract over fiduciary duties.   
 
In the common view, enforceable contracts facilitate relation specific 
investment by enforcing the parties’ promises, such as the promise to pay for a 
conforming tender.  Contracting also helps courts discern the parties’ promises, so 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Gilson, Sable and Scott (forthcoming 2014 Cornell Law Review) and Schwartz and 
Watson (2013) argue that contract has two functions: to enforce promises and to communicate 
sufficient context to courts so that courts know what the promises actually were. 
34 See Gilson and Schwartz (2013). 
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that a court can effectively compare what was promised to what was delivered.  
Contracts play this second role by describing the context in which parties make 
promises and the parties’ goals in making them.  Contractual descriptions and role 
recitals are especially reliable signals of the parties’ intentions because both sides 
must agree to them.  For example, a buyer would not accept a contract that 
described the widgets the seller was to make and the buyer’s plans for those 
widgets unless the buyer actually wanted the widgets to implement the plans.  
Relevant here, controllers often consume project returns, both for good and bad 
reasons, through the related transactions they create and pursue.  The signaling role 
that contract could play is reliably to identify the diversion technologies the 
controllers plan to use and the magnitudes of the private benefits those 
technologies permit controllers to realize.  Controllers in the legal regime we 
advocate thus would promise investors τ of the firm and describe how the 
controllers plan to consume 1 – τ of a successful project.  Potential investors would 
not supply funds unless they believed that the combination of court and contract 
would restrict the controllers to that 1 – τ share.  Thus, the contracting process, by 
increasing the information available to the court and reducing the price of 
acquiring it, allows more effective judicial review, and hence more credible 
commitment by the controller, than fiduciary duty reviews under a fairness 
standard.35 
 
The controllers’ diversion technology can take five forms:  
 
  (a) Compensation that exceeds the market wage for the position at issue. 
 
(b) Loans at below market rates or that are permissive regarding forgiveness. 
 
(c) Related party transactions (tunneling): (i) asset sales to or asset purchases 
from another controlled entity at nonmarket prices; (ii) other interested party 
transactions, such as granting an exclusive territory to a controlled entity 
when exclusivity is not the market norm, when it is not the most efficient 
counterparty, or on better terms than the market would dictate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Enriques (2014) stresses the informational barriers to effective fairness review standing 
alone. 
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(d) Taking business opportunities that would otherwise by pursued by the 
controlled company. 
 
(e) Amenities that are acquired with company money, such as corporate jets, 
country club memberships and corporate meetings held in desirable 
locations.36 
 
Structure importantly determines which method controllers use.  For example, 
controllers of the top firm in a pyramid may use related party transactions while 
controllers in a dual class stock structure may use direct compensation.  The 
availability of such structures differs among jurisdictions. (Gilson, 2006).37   
 
Contracts could describe, and commit controllers to, particular volumes and 
pricing levels for related party transactions such that in expectation controllers 
would take no more than 1 – τ of their firm.   For example, the controllers of firm 
A could commit that asset sales to or asset purchases from controlled firm B would 
aggregate no more than $X annually, and at prices within one standard deviation 
from market value.  Similarly, controllers could agree to cap compensation to a 
control group that also holds management positions at a level that exceeds a 
comparable company market basket of salaries by no more than a specified 
percentage.38  Controllers also could promise that their company would satisfy no 
more than a specified portion of the company’s procurement needs through 
purchases from controlled entities.  The price of these transactions could then be 
compared to the price in specified markets to ensure that the prices in the 
controlled sales did not exceed market prices by more than a specified amount 
(reflecting, perhaps, the difference between an implicit obligation to provide all of 
the company’s needs for that input and the spot market price for it).  Intra-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36Such perks appear to be used in situations where they enhance managerial productivity 
(e.g., a corporate jet when factories or mines are hard to reach).  See Rajan and Wulf (2006). 
37 Hwa-Jin Kim (2014) argues that leveraging control by means of a transparent dual 
class structure facilitates monitoring of private benefit levels compared to an opaque complex 
circular ownership structure as commonplace in Korean chaebols,  
38Corporate salaries today are partly a function of a comparison between what a company 
pays and what a comparable set of companies pays. 
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corporate group loans could be regulated similarly.39  Alternatively, controllers 
could commit to limiting their outside business activities to specified areas.40  
When an express share is not specified, the court could evaluate controller 
behavior by aggregating the sums that these contractually designated transactions 
involve.  Also, contractual disclosure of the diversion technology would channel 
the court’s inquiry and therefore make performance more observable and 
verifiable; it could better compare the level of diversion the controllers specified to 
the level they actually took.41  We would expect the range and effectiveness of 
contracting techniques would improve through experience were they to be allowed. 
 
This leads to our final point concerning the contracting techniques that likely 
would be associated with a default fiduciary duty regime.  Contract creation costs 
and asymmetric information commonly would cause fiduciary agreements to be 
incomplete in important respects.  Therefore, contracts likely would combine 
explicit rules with standards: particularized commitments with promises to cabin 
controller transfers within “reasonable” limits, that would be determined by a court 
with the benefit of information drawn from the parties’ experience under the 
contract and industry practice.  As suggested above, contractual techniques, such 
as discursive descriptions of the contract’s purpose and specifications of the 
applicable context –would permit a court to fill out a standard in accordance with 
the parties’ intentions.  The court, that is, could recover the parties’ number – the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39The size of a company’s airline fleet also could be contractually capped.  Controller 
perks likely would decline, however, if controllers could contract directly for money. 
40Line of business restrictions are common in lending agreements today. 
41Simeon Djankov and his coauthors suggest that regulation of self-dealing transactions is 
best done by requiring extensive disclosure and then having deals be ratified, or not, by 
disinterested shareholders. See Djankov, et al (2008). This proposal raises two concerns.  First, 
convening disinterested shareholder committees and providing them with financial and legal 
advice is costly and time consuming.  This solution thus works well for large “single shot” 
transactions such as leveraged buyouts or the taking of a major corporate opportunity.  The 
solution may be impractical for the routine transactions, described above, through which 
controllers pay themselves.  Second, process-based proposals are a complement not a substitute 
for contracting.  Process-based approvals also would require judicial review.  Courts would have 
to police the controllers’ disclosure and compare it to the firm’s actual behavior.  Contract thus 
would usefully complement this proposed reform as well by providing a better standard 
contained in the contract’s terms under which courts can evaluate controller performance.  Again 
the point is not to eliminate private benefits, but to allow controllers to credibly commit to their 
size. 
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private benefits level they chose ex ante – rather than a number that seems fair ex 
post. 42   
 
The use of standards in these ways to police ex post controller opportunism 
requires courts with skill and experience. Thus, our proposal to allow contracting 
over what is presently the subject of mandatory fiduciary duty rules presupposes 
competent – that is, smart and experienced – and independent judges.43  
Specialized courts like the Delaware Chancery Court and the Commercial Division 
of the Queen’s Bench in the UK, as well as the courts of large commercial 
jurisdictions such as New York probably would perform well.  The courts in other 
states or countries likely would do worse.  Many US firms are incorporated in 
Delaware and commercial parties often choose to have their contracts governed by 
New York or United Kingdom law, and some specify venue in these jurisdictions 
to assure access to competent courts.44  Hence, our recommendation to change 
fiduciary law to a set of defaults would be more productive in jurisdictions with 
effective courts than it would be elsewhere.  Based on this analysis, we have 
argued elsewhere that the capacity of companies in EU member states that do not 
have courts sufficiently effective to allow controllers to credibly commit to the 
private benefits they offered the public would gain from an EU level commercial 
court that allowed controlled companies to opt into its jurisdiction (Gilson and 
Schwartz (2013)).   
 
The little evidence that exists is consistent with our analysis.  We argue that 
free contracting and effective courts are complements.  The two sanctions for a 
contract breach are legal judgments and reputation.  Thus, our analysis suggests 
that contracting also would complement reputation: that is, when firms can 
establish reputations in the credit market by repeat access, they would also write 
private benefit contracts.  These contracts would complement the reputation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42The practice of contracting parties’ sometimes to combine detailed specifications 
regulating behavior with standards is thoughtfully explored in Scott and Triantis (2006). See also 
Gilson, Sabel and Scott (2013) at 170, 184 and Schwartz and Watson (2013). 
43  Dammann (2014 at 497-98) argues that a corporate law composed of defaults works 
well in the U.S. because of the high quality of the courts, but would work less well elsewhere. 
44 Consistent with this analysis, companies incorporated in Delaware increasingly are 
including venue provisions in their articles or bylaws that require breach of fiduciary duty claims 
to be brought in Delaware courts.  See Grundfest & Savelle 2013. 
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sanction because the contracts would reduce the costs to potential investors of 
learning whether the firm complied with its promised level of private benefits or 
exploited related party transactions more than promised, just as contracts would 
reduce the cost to courts of making these determinations.  Hence, we predict that 
firms would use contract even when they can establish reputations. 
 
Delaware recently permitted public companies to contract out of fiduciary 
duties if they used an LLC or LP rather than the traditional corporate form.45  The 
public companies that use these corporate structures are more likely to be repeat 
players in the equity market than the common public company. Hence, the 
companies could establish capital market reputations.   Nevertheless, the 
companies used contract to structure their relationships with investors, rather than 
simply relying on fiduciary duty as the default rule.  This evidence suggests that 
controlled public companies also would use contract if they could. 
 
4.2. Responses  
 
A common response to our proposal to open up the contracting space for 
private benefits is that parties can contract over private benefits today.  This 
response identifies two purported substitutes for direct contracting, of which the 
first is that contracts over private benefits can be recast as compensation contracts, 
which typically are not subject to judicial scrutiny under the entire fairness 
standard.  Hence, there is no need for legal reform to allow private benefit 
contracts.  The second objection is that one U.S. state – Nevada – apparently 
allows such contracting so that a controlling shareholder who wants to contract 
over private benefits can incorporate or reincorporate in Nevada. That few 
companies have done so again suggests that there is no need for the law to open up 
the contracting space.  
The claim that a compensation contract can substitute for direct contracting 
over private benefits is misplaced. Initially, the possibility exists only for 
companies in which the controllers also can make themselves officers.  Many 
controlled companies operate pyramids or hold stakes in other companies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45See note 6, supra. 
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Controllers thus must write compensation contracts that govern the officers of 
these subordinate or outside companies.  When controllers are badly motivated, 
they would write contracts with such outside officers that permitted the controllers 
to consume private benefits.  Hence, the problems of how to motivate the 
controllers and how to prevent tunneling would remain. 
Turning to companies in which a controller can make himself an officer, 
casting a contract in the form of compensation would not avoid enhanced judicial 
review if the contract expressly permits the controllers to consume private benefits.  
For example, let a compensation contract provide that in return for employment as 
CEO, a controlling shareholder’s wholly owned company can sell products to the 
corporation at a specified price.  Because the controller would be on both sides of 
this transaction, courts would ignore this formal subterfuge, and treat the contract 
like any other private benefit transaction.  
 To avoid this problem, a controller might write the compensation contract in 
general terms, with payoffs perhaps based on the corporation’s performance rather 
than on the precise form of a related party transaction. To see why this solution 
would fail, recall that there are two moral hazard concerns: to motivate the 
controllers to work, and to prevent the controllers from underreporting returns and 
consuming the excess as private benefits.  The controllers’ capital structure 
promise solves the incentive concern.  A contract that failed to address private 
benefits directly could not solve the tunneling concern.  This is because the 
minority investors own a fraction of the firm.  Thus, a compensation contract with 
a controller would not eliminate the controller’s incentive to underreport project 
returns in order to reduce the payoff from that fraction that the minority would 
otherwise realize.   
Rather, as we argued above, an effective contract over private benefits 
would respond directly to the underreporting concern.  Such a contract likely 
would combine both precise terms and more general standards, with the standards 
providing the needed flexibility to respond to changes in the company’s business 
environment while keeping the firm to its promises.  (Gilson, Sabel & Scott 2013)  
In the event of disagreement, a court would then engage in contract interpretation 
of the standards, with the guidance provided by the drafters, rather than make a 
free-ranging inquiry into what is the entirely fair.  And to summarize, a contract 
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that responds to the relevant problem, of misreporting returns and diverting the 
excess, would not take the form of a compensation contract.    
The second response to our proposal holds that Nevada allows such 
contracts; hence, that large numbers of public corporations with controlling 
shareholders do not migrate to Nevada demonstrates either that corporations can 
contract over private benefits today, or that they do not want the opportunity.  This 
view also is mistaken because Nevada law cannot substitute for making fiduciary 
duty a default rule rather than mandatory.   
Nevada goes a great deal further than our proposal that close judicial 
scrutiny of private benefits be treated as a default rule subject to contractual 
adjustment.  Rather, Nevada law provides that officers and directors are only liable 
for intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law (Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 78.138(7) (LexisNexis 2010; Barzuza 2012, p. 950).  We argue that free 
contracting would complement effective judicial review.  Nevada eliminates 
judicial review altogether.  Thus, Nevada law shifts the problem confronting a 
contract drafter from identifying the specific elements of fiduciary duty that would 
be adjusted with respect to a particular contract over private benefits, to 
reconstructing the terms of fiduciary duty that, in effect, would survive the 
intended adjustment. Put another way, a controlled company that moved to Nevada 
would have to recreate in its contracts with investors the law of fiduciary 
obligation in order to specify, also in its contracts, the particular parts of that law 
that the company intended to modify.  This would be a difficult and costly 
contracting task.  In addition, the breadth of Nevada’s invitation to eliminate 
fiduciary duties creates a signaling problem for controllers.  Investors may read a 
controlled firm’s move to Nevada as a message that the firm intends to consume 
private benefits without constraint.  This is inconsistent with the signal the 
controllers want to send: that they will adhere to the capital structure that forms the 
firm and not dilute the minority’s share.  Hence, the controlled Nevada firm would 
have a signaling problem in addition to a contracting problem.  These obstacles 
28	  
	  
suggest that the “they could have moved to Nevada” objection needs better support 
than it now has.46 
 
5. Credible commitment under weak courts and thin capital markets. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
We argued above that permitting controllers to contract over the size and 
nature of related party transactions would complement duty of loyalty judicial 
review in preventing controllers from subverting the capital structures they bring to 
market.  Such contracting would substitute for reputation because many controlled 
companies enter capital markets infrequently.  Any contracting proposal 
presupposes capable and honest courts.  Hence, an implication of our analysis is 
that where courts are not capable, and may not be honest, and where companies 
enter capital markets infrequently, controlled companies should not exist. Investors 
will assume that controllers who cannot credibly commit to cap private benefit 
consumption will take everything, and the investors’ best response is not to supply 
capital.  Apparently to the contrary, controlled companies also exist in countries 
without effective courts or active capital markets. (See, e.g., La Porta, et al 1999).  
The shares of these companies trade at much larger discounts than the shares of 
controlled companies in more advanced legal systems, however, and the discounts 
differ among countries. (Nenova 2003; Dyck & Zingales, 2004)  These facts raise 
two questions: (i) Why do controlled companies have any equity investors at all? 
(ii) How can the ability of controlled companies to commit to capital structures be 
improved in relatively ineffective legal systems?  Part 5 addresses the first 
question, and here we write on a clean slate: the literature has not considered the 
nonlegal ways that controllers use to commit not to consume private benefits. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Cremers & Sepe (2014) note that performance of companies changing their state of 
incorporation from Delaware to Nevada show an increase in performance, in their view because 
this allows the shareholders, by choosing a state that restricts shareholders rights, to credibly 
commit to a long-term view of performance.  The difficulty with this result is that shifting state 
of incorporation requires a shareholder vote.  If shareholders are willing to vote to reduce their 
rights as a commitment device, however, there is no need to shift state of incorporation because 
under Delaware law the rights of shareholders can be adjusted as desired through charter 
amendments so long as the shareholders will vote for them. 
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We consider two commitment categories:  reputation-based commitment and 
structural commitment.  The first captures the most familiar enforcement 
mechanism for implicit contracts; the second is more novel, showing how the 
characteristics of a company’s industry, its business structure and its strategy can 
function as endogenous implicit enforcement mechanisms.  The two categories are 
not exhaustive.  Rather, we wish to open the issue of the diversity of possible 
implicit commitment techniques and how they may function, and to encourage 
further effort to understand these arrangements.  Effective legal systems and 
related institutions take significant time to develop (Rodrik (2008); Dammann and 
Hansmann (2008) (collecting studies).  It thus is important in the meantime to 
better understand what works under the “Rule of Not-Law.”	  47    
 
 
5.2 Reputation-based mechanisms 
 
Reputation facilitates commitment in financing contexts when the capital 
market can punish agents who break their promises by withdrawing, or setting 
onerous terms for, future funding.  Hence, a stand-alone firm that enters the capital 
market infrequently cannot establish a reputation.  Firms in developing countries 
respond by establishing conglomerate structures: the several entities that make up 
the structure enter the capital market at various times, and this permits the market 
to punish later entrants if earlier entrants behave badly.  The “center” thus has an 
incentive to behave well.  In the traditional view, entrepreneurs form 
conglomerates when an internal capital market will allocate capital more 
efficiently than an external market because the internal market has lower 
information costs.  (Williamson 1981 at 1537, 1555-60).   We add here an 
additional reason for the prominence of this industrial structure to exist in 
developing economies: the conglomerate form can facilitate capturing economies 
of scale in establishing good reputations.       
 
5.2.1. How conglomerates function  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In this respect, our work is consistent with the emphasis of a literature exemplified by 
Masahiko Aoki and Avner Grief that institutions should be assessed in the context of the 
particular circumstances and countries in which they evolved. (Aoki (2001); Grief (2006). 
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The controllers commonly raise equity to get the business going.  Particular 
firms within the corporate group likely also will need equity to initiate their 
projects.  The larger the conglomerate, the more likely it is for parts of it to require 
external finance.  As a consequence, the capital market can punish controllers for 
eroding the public’s share of an early project by withholding or increasing the cost 
of funding for other parts of the corporate enterprise.  In sum, while stand-alone 
controlled firms may access the capital market infrequently, the conglomerate 
structure itself, by increasing the number of businesses that may return to the 
capital market for financing, creates an incentive for its controllers to establish 
reputations for keeping promises. This reputation-based explanation implies that 
the fraction of conglomerates should be lower in developed countries than in 
developing countries and that there should be less rent extraction in developing 
country conglomerates than is commonly thought.  Both implications are supported 
by the literature.  See Khanna & Yafeh 2007) and Siegel and Choudbury 
(2012).We thus suggest that the conglomerate’s internal capital market may 
allocate capital among operating units – from those generating positive cash flow 
to those that need additional capital for investments – more efficiently than an 
external capital market unsupported by effective legal institutions for reasons 
different than commonly claimed.  The reputation-based scale economies 
explanation for developing country conglomerates based on repeat play access to 
the external capital market by units of the conglomerate thus links the 
conglomerate’s operation of its internal capital market to the conglomerate’s 
recourse to the external capital market.  The result is to make the external capital 
market a more feasible source of equity capital.  Indeed, coming full circle, in this 
setting an organizational structure that makes resort to the external capital market 
more likely operates itself as a credible commitment. 
 
That a company’s ability to make reputation-based credible commitments 
increases with scale can be generalized beyond equity issues.  A corporation can 
also send signals of its commitment to capital market integrity through its product 
market operations.  Firms have incentives, when contract enforcement is weak, to 
exploit the sunk cost investments of suppliers and customers by renegotiating 
prices or terms.  Firms that eschew such behavior can establish a good capital 
market reputation as well as a good product market reputation.  This is because 
investors who supply equity capital to a controlled firm, in effect, are making a 
sunk cost investment in the firm.  Potential investors may reason that a firm that 
fails to exploit in the product market context will not exploit in the capital market 
context.  Therefore, the more diverse the range of businesses in which the company 
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participates, the more signals of cooperative behavior the company can send and 
the greater the extent to which scale and scope economies associated with 
reputation can be captured (Gilson 2007; Khanna and Yafeh (2007)).    
 
 
 5.2.2State ownership   
 
 The problem of how a controlling shareholder can credibly commit to a 
capital structure is even more starkly posed when the controller is a state controlled 
corporation.  Because a state cannot limit its sovereign powers in a fashion that 
restricts its extraction of rents, the state should have great difficulty raising 
minority capital.  How they do so is an important question because state ownership 
is common in many countries.  We very briefly consider two examples of this 
puzzle, highlighted both by the magnitude of the companies and the value of the 
minority stakes:  Chinese public corporations48 and state-controlled oil companies.  
Our analysis of these government firms is consistent with our claims that 
conglomerate firms can form good capital market reputations by having sub-
entities enter the market at different times and by behaving well in product 
markets. 
 
 The largest corporations in China have both a controlling shareholder and 
public minority shareholders.49  China does not have an effective legal system that 
protects minority shareholders.  Nonetheless, the Chinese state controls a large 
number of firms that function in various markets.  Thus, investors can expect a 
large number of state controlled firms to come to the capital market over time, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48We focus on China because of the size of its state-controlled sector.  The same analysis 
may apply in countries where state control plays a smaller but yet substantial role.  Lin and 
Cabrelli (2014) describe the unsatisfactory legal protections for Chinese minority shareholders.  
See also Pargendler (2012) (surveying state ownership). 
49Lin and Milhaupt describe the Chinese ownership structure.  “More than two-thirds of 
Chinese companies in the Global Fortune 500 are state-owned enterprises. Excluding banks and 
insurance companies, 40% controlling stakes in the largest and most important of the firms are 
owned ostensibly on behalf of the Chinese people by a central holding company known as the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which has been 
described as ‘the world’s largest controlling shareholder.’ Though elite firms such as Sinopec or 
China Mobile are listed on stock exchanges in Shanghai, Hong Kong or other world financial 
capitals, they are nested within vertically integrated groups. Their majority shareholder is the 
“core” company of the group – which is itself 100% owned by SASAC.”  Lin and Milhaupt 
(2013) (quote from Boston Consulting Group (2007)).  
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either in IPOs or in later offerings.50 Potential investors, particular foreign 
investors, thus will have numerous opportunities to punish state firms for the 
defalcations of earlier state firms.  Also, investors can observe how the state firms 
function in product and service markets.	  
 
 Pargendler, et al (2013) consider minority shareholders in state controlled 
companies in a particular context: state-controlled oil companies.  They report that 
state controlled oil companies are stunningly important: they control some 90 
percent of the world’s oil reserves and 75 percent of oil and gas production.  Some, 
like Brazil’s Petrobas and Norway’s Statoil, have significant minority 
shareholders.  The sheer size of the domestic and foreign policy importance of 
these companies heightens the concern when the controlling shareholder is a 
government: the controlling shareholder also controls the judicial mechanisms that 
are so important in allowing credible commitment in private companies. Our 
analysis suggests that investors will treat state controlled oil companies less 
favorably than they treat Chinese public firms.  This is because the oil companies 
are stand alone firms, not conglomerates, and so cannot use the conglomerate 
methods of establishing reputations.  This view is consistent with the Pargendler 
analysis.  Petrobas, for example, is the single most discounted firm (measured by 
price-to-book ratio) among the world’s 100 largest corporations.   
  
5.3  Structure-based explanations 
 
 In Part 5.2 we considered techniques and ownership structures that facilitate 
commitment when there is a low likelihood of repeat play between individual 
controllers and capital market participants.    The common theme among the 
examples was that increasing the number of parties on both the sell side (by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 This analysis takes seriously the notion that Chinese state owned companies are 
markedly different along this dimension than Chinese companies in which the state does not hold 
a controlling equity stake.  Recent research argues that the difference may be superficial.  
(Milhaput & Zheng, forthcoming 2015).   If so, then the discussion in the text generalizes to all 
Chinese publicly held companies.  It is also the case that the government has a much wider range 
of techniques by which to divert private benefits – for example, by manipulation of tax rates – 
than do companies controlled by private parties.  Because potential minority shareholders are 
aware of the range of techniques, the argument in the text applies to these peculiarly 
governmental diversion techniques as well: government manipulation of tax rates will affect the 
value associated with future issuances of equity by state-controlled companies.   
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conglomerate organization) and the buy side (the market as counterparty rather 
than a single buyer) would cause controllers to expect that the capital market 
would punish the controllers through refusals to finance subordinate controlled 
firms or by increasing the cost of capital, and so make commitment credible.  In 
this Part, we shift from focusing on the expectation of future dealings to make a 
capital structure commitment credible to the potential for the character of the 
company’s business to play that role. The analysis below argues that rather than 
creating commitment ability by making product market investments, especially 
those that require repeat play to pay off, controllers also can effectively bond their 
commitment through the corporate structures they choose.  Some corporate 
structures facilitate while others impede the extraction of excess transfers – a pre-
commitment rather than a direct bonding strategy.  In effect, this approach 
represents the industrial organization of capital structure commitments. 
 
 
  
 
 5.3.1 Absence of vertical integration. 
 
Tunneling – transactions between a controlled company and other 
companies in which the controlling shareholder has a larger equity stake (see, e.g., 
Atanasov, et al (2011)) – is the most commonly highlighted form of minority 
expropriation. (Enriques 2014).  Related party transactions, particularly in a 
vertical supply chain, are especially suited to such expropriation because it is not 
otherwise easy to transfer large amounts of money to a controlling shareholder (or 
companies she controls).  As a result, interested transactions and other forms of 
tunneling are attractive because they provide a large volume of transactions that 
involve the appearance of a legitimate transfer of funds to a controlling shareholder 
from the controlled corporation.  Thus, the absence of vertical integration, by 
limiting the possibility of intragroup dealings, can serve as a credible signal that 
controller rent extraction will be limited.  Such a signal depends on industrial 
organization rather than on reputation or the legal system (Gilson, 2007 at 1658).  
The empirical evidence on the extent of vertical integration in emerging market 
conglomerates is interesting; there is substantial variance both among countries 
and among companies within the same countries (Khanna and Yafeh 2007).  
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However, the literature does not generally distinguish between conglomerates with 
and without intra-group supply relationships. 
 
A similar industrial organization analysis may help explain the recent pattern 
of founding entrepreneurs retaining control of large web oriented companies by 
going public with dual class structures – for example, Google, Facebook and 
Zynga.51  Such companies have no supply chain relationships with their controlling 
shareholders.  As a result, it may be easy for the minority to observe asset transfers 
to the controlling shareholder.  The nature of the controlled company’s business 
and the technique used to leverage control thus may function as a credible 
commitment not to erode the minority’s share. (Hwa-Jin Kim 2014).	   
 
5.4. Treatment of minority shareholders as a signal in the product market. 
 
In 5.2.1 we noted that controlled companies in jurisdictions with both bad 
shareholder protection and bad commercial law may use their behavior in product 
markets to send a signal of their integrity to capital markets.  A reverse form of 
such a signal also exists: A firm may use its treatment of minority shareholders to 
signal to product markets that the firm is a reliable supplier or customer. (Gilson 
2007 at 648-649).  The treatment of minority shareholders sometimes is observable 
by a company’s potential product market trading partners at a low cost, perhaps 
because such exploitation will be covered by the local newspapers.52  Fair 
treatment of minority shareholders may then evidence the corporation’s integrity, 
including its commitment to performing its contractual obligations, a signal that is 
credible because it is costly. The presence of minority shareholders then can be 
explained not only by the need for capital at the time of the initial public offering 
or in the future, but as a way of developing a general good reputation that will be 
valuable in the product market.  From this perspective, minority shareholders play 
the role of reputational canaries; they cheaply but credibly convey to potential 
traders that the corporation is an honest trading partner. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51See Chasen 2012. (During 2011, 20 companies went pubic in the U.S. with dual class, 
up from 19 in 2010.). 
52See Dyck, et al (2008) (treating newspapers as a corporate governance constraint). 
35	  
	  
To be sure, this brief account of the relation between minority shareholder 
treatment and possible product market response is incomplete.  For example, how 
do potential traders know what the acceptable level of transfer is, so they can know 
when the canary is gasping?  Any reputation-based account of exchange requires a 
shared understanding of what constitutes appropriate performance.  The difference 
here is that using minority shareholders as a signal of commitment to contractual 
performance at least provides an enforcement mechanism.53  Mistreatment of 
minority shareholders will be punished in the product market, where the company 
is a repeat player.54    
5.5. Shareholder Composition 
The composition of the minority shareholder base also may serve to make 
credible a controlling shareholder commitment to a capital structure.  We offer two 
examples, which operate by using shareholders as monitors.  In the first example, 
customers of or suppliers to the controlled corporation hold significant investments 
in the corporation, in effect endogenizing the controlled corporation constituencies.  
Their ownership creates an incentive for them to restrict controllers to agreed upon 
shares because transferring assets out of the corporation may affect the 
corporation’s performance, which will be observable.  These shareholders’ dual 
roles as customers or suppliers and investors give the shareholders the information 
and the ability to enforce controller promises through the shareholders  commercial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53Corporate governance also can be affected by conditions in the corporation’s product 
market in ways that can restrict the extent to which a controlling shareholder can invade the 
public’s share. The more intense is product market competition in the controlled company’s 
industry, the less freedom controllers have to divert needed resources from the company.  Recent 
empirical evidence is consistent with this analysis.  Guadalupe and Perez Gonzalez (2010) report 
that increases in the intensity of competition lead to a statistically and economically significant 
reduction in both the level of private benefits of control and their dispersion among companies.  
Other studies report similar results with respect to corporate governance generally.  See, e.g., 
Chou, et al (2011) (corporate governance has a significant effect on firm value only when 
product market competition is weak); Classens and Yurtoglu (2013) (corporate governance 
problems are less severe when competition is already high in factor markets).  Because we are 
concerned here with how controllers can credibly commit to the capital structure they bring to 
market, we do not pursue this issue here. 
54For empirical evidence in developed markets that listed companies that commit 
financial fraud (i.e., mistreat shareholders) are punished in the product market, see Karpoff, et al 
(2008).  The product market role of minority shareholders is critically assessed in Kang (2011).  
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relationship.  A similar analysis has been applied to the vertical kieretsu structure 
in Japan (Gilson and Roe 1993).55 
  
The second example of the potential role of minority blockholders arises 
from increased institutional equity ownership as a result of growing retirement 
savings.56  Here the Chilean experience is illustrative.  On the one hand, Chilean 
public companies typically have a controlling shareholder.  On the other, the five 
Chilean private pension funds that arose out of the 1981 pension reform are major 
shareholders with sufficient shares in the aggregate to elect a director in many 
corporations, facilitated by both a legal requirement of cumulative voting and 
explicit authorization of the funds to cooperate for purposes of director election.  
(OECD 2011).  In countries like Chile, where pension fund exit is constrained by 
market liquidity, voice may have an impact even in the face of a controlling 
shareholder. 
 
5.6. Political Economy 
 
A final structural support for the credibility of controller promises comes 
from the government rather than market participants – a political economy 
analysis.   Suppose that having a stock market is for developing countries a badge 
of modernity that does not demand a complete economic justification.  The 
government wants a stock market, the controlling shareholder goes along by 
issuing minority equity and paying the implicit tax associated with a higher cost of 
capital, and citizens invest because external investment opportunities are limited by 
regulation.  While this account also lacks an explicit limit on excessive transfer 
payments to controllers, the government may be able to enforce informally a 
ceiling that will come to be known to participants in the capital market.57  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Note 18 above suggested that controllers may retain independent monitors to police 
tunneling, but the note also remarked that the solution had only theoretical appeal because 
markets for monitors seem not to exist.  The analysis here suggests that those markets may exist 
indirectly, in the monitoring roles customers and suppliers can provide.  If this is so, the prices 
charged to or paid from these parties may partly reflect their monitoring cost. 
56Gilson & Gordon (2013) document the large holdings of institutional investors in the 
U.S., and tie those holdings to the rise of activist shareholders. 
57In the case of China, see Liebman and Milhaupt (2008). Private benefit acquisition in 
China is described and decried in Shan (2012).  
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form of informal enforcement is generally understood to have been how the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance enforced the obligations of main banks to bail out 
failing borrowers despite the absence of any formal obligation to do so Aoki, et al 
(1994 at 31-32). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The principals of a controlled company that enters the equity market to raise 
funds must solve two moral hazard problems.  The first is to persuade potential 
investors that the controllers will work hard.  This problem, we show, is relatively 
easy to solve.  The controllers retain a share of the firm large enough to 
compensate them for exerting optimal effort. Out of the remainder, the controllers 
offer shares to the public whose value, in expectation, equals the cost of the firm’s 
project. The second moral hazard problem is more difficult: to persuade potential 
investors that the controllers will not take more of the firm than they agreed to 
retain.  We show here that (a) because atomized investors will not monitor 
corporate officers and because the investors often lack information, the controllers 
always have an incentive to take more than their share; and (b) judicial review 
under the duty of loyalty cannot eliminate private benefit consumption altogether, 
even when courts are competent and honest. 
 
In the rational expectations world we analyze, controllers bear the costs of 
an imperfect solution to the second moral hazard problem.  Investors anticipate 
tunneling and demand more of the firm than would equal expected project costs.  
This reduces controller returns and may make the pursuit of some positive value 
projects unprofitable.  Therefore, controllers would like to commit not to take more 
of the firm than the share they promised to retain.  Judicial review facilitates such 
commitment but, as said, is not fully effective.  The normative problem we address 
thus is how to improve further the ability of controllers to credibly commit to the 
corporate structures they propose to the market. 
 
Controllers often realize their share of the firm through related party 
transactions.  Delaware law subjects transactions through which controllers may 
divert private benefits to an entire fairness test.   The test requires only that the 
terms of such a transaction be within a range of reasonableness, which leaves room 
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for a controlling shareholder to acquire a significant share of project returns.  On 
the other hand, the law does put a limit on their size. This unaided judicial review 
is not the best solution to the controllers’ commitment concern for two reasons.  
Regarding the first, the transactions in which controllers engage may be efficient – 
the inter-corporate transfer – but are subject to abuse.  As a consequence of the 
courts’ inability always to distinguish accurately the efficiency aspects from the 
private benefit aspects, judicial review may over or under deter controller actions.  
Second, the goal of judicial review should be to restrict controllers to the capital 
structure share they proposed to investors.  In contrast, courts under entire fairness 
review attempt to replicate the market solution – i.e, the market price and terms –
for related party transactions.  There is no reason to think that the fair number so 
generated approximates the efficient capital structure number.  This analysis 
supports our principal normative recommendation, which is to help courts by 
opening up the contracting space.  Though expert application of a legal standard 
can be effective, existing law prevents parties from adjusting or explicating that 
standard through contract.  This is so although a contract over how controllers 
commit to a capital structure, by setting the context and refining the standard to fit 
the transaction, could improve the performance of the reviewing court.  Fiduciary 
duty and the corresponding entire fairness standard are, with few exceptions, 
mandatory.  We thus propose that the governing standard be made a default rule, 
leaving parties free to improve on the standard when possible.  The result, by 
improving judicial review, would be to increase the controllers’ ability credibly to 
commit to the shares they agreed to take. 
 
Our view apparently predicts that controlled companies will be rare in 
developing economies because of their weak legal systems. Absent a controlling 
shareholder’s ability to commit to a capital structure, adverse selection should 
crowd out minority shareholders in these countries. To the contrary, public 
corporations with controlling shareholders are common in jurisdictions that lack an 
effective judicial system, primarily but not exclusively developing countries. We 
review a variety of reputational and structural techniques that are partial substitutes 
for an effective judiciary over the lengthy time necessary for the development of 
good courts.  There is no reason to believe, however, that these substitutes are as 
efficient as the combination of contract and good courts would be.  This 
qualification resolves the conflict between our prediction and that of the law and 
finance literature; it explains both the existence of controlling shareholders and the 
empirical evidence of the large minority share discounts in countries without an 
effective judiciary.  Alternative mechanisms allow the market to calculate the size, 
often substantial, of the discount.  The size of the discount frames the importance 
of better understanding how credible controller commitments can be supported. 
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